It has been a while since my last blog post. Over the summer, I spent some time traveling in Kyrgyzstan — an unforgettable adventure. I loved driving along off-road routes (though getting stuck in the mud was less enjoyable), meeting kind and inventive people, and seeing the highest mountains I’ve ever encountered — some towering over 7000 meters. The peaceful beauty of nature there was remarkable and provided a much needed break from work.
Of course, working in academia means returning to the Netherlands in time for the new academic year. The first teaching block is already almost over, and as always, teaching full-time leaves less room for research. Still, I like to stay up to date with developments related to my research interests. That’s why today, I want to turn my attention back to Estonia — where municipal elections will take place this Sunday, 19 October.
Two recent developments make these elections particularly interesting to follow.
First, a constitutional amendment adopted in March revoked local voting rights for non-EU residents. Stateless residents will face the same restriction, although they are allowed to vote one final time in these upcoming elections. The change was justified by the government as a security measure in response to Russia’s war in Ukraine. However, it disproportionately affects Estonia’s large Russian-speaking minority — more than 80.000 of whom hold Russian passports — stripping many long-term residents of their right to vote.1
At the same time, Estonia’s political landscape has shifted. A new coalition government between the Reform Party and Estonia 200 recently presented its coalition agreement and ministerial candidates. Earlier this year, Prime Minister Kristen Michal dismissed the Social Democratic Party, accusing it of blocking reforms proposed by the coalition’s economically liberal core. The two remaining parties decided to continue governing together.
Among their key policy goals are increasing defense spending to 5% of GDP, developing a domestic defense industry, cutting corporate taxes, and reducing public administration staff — measures that reflect both the ongoing security threat from Russia and a commitment to economic liberalization.2
In light of these two developments, the local election results will be interesting to interpret. In areas with large Russian-speaking populations who no longer have the right to vote, we may see different outcomes compared to the 2021 elections. Traditionally, the Center Party has enjoyed strong support among Russian-speakers, so it could lose votes this time.
At the national level, however, the governing parties themselves have seen declining support. In the 2023 national elections, Reform received 31.2% and Estonia 200 13.3% of the vote. Current opinion polls suggest that their popularity has dropped sharply, to around 13% for Reform and 2% for Estonia 200.3
The election outcomes will provide an important indication of how Estonia’s electorate responds to both domestic reform and the national government’s proposed response to continuing regional security threats.
- https://www.lemonde.fr/en/russia/article/2025/03/26/estonia-s-parliament-bans-local-voting-for-non-europeans-targeting-russians_6739540_140.html ↩︎
- https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2025-03-26/estonia-michals-new-centre-right-government ↩︎
- https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/estonia ↩︎